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Abstract 
The dissertation examines the influence of founding family ownership on payout policy 
of Greek listed firms for the period 2008-2014. This examination is based on the hypoth-
eses that the relationship between founding family ownership and dividend payments 
is not linear and that families receive higher dividends than prescribed by law in order 
to satisfy their income needs. The results of the analysis demonstrate that founding fam-
ily ownership is predominant with more than 50% of the companies having as control-
ling shareholder the founder or the heirs. It is, also, shown that firms controlled by the 
founding family, on average, pay less dividends than other firms which are controlled by 
another type of shareholder. The nonlinear relation of family ownership and dividends 
is confirmed by the results, but founding families’ higher taste for dividend payments is 
not. On the contrary, higher family ownership seems to be related to lower dividends 
than those required by law. 
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1. Introduction 
Many studies took place the previous years trying to determine the factors that in-
fluence the dividend policy of corporations. Some of them focused on tax preference 
theory (Auerbach A. J., 1979; Masulis R. W. and Trueman B., 1988), while others suggest 
signaling (Ambarish R., John K. and Williams J., 1987; Kale J. R. and Noe T. H., 1990; 
Rodriguez R. J., 1992) or agency cost theory (Jensen M. C. and Meckling W. H., 1976; 
Easterbrook F. H., 1984; Shleifer A. and Vishny R. W., 1986). 
Apart from these theories, the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen M. C., 1986) as well 
as the development of behavioral models (Lintner J., 1956; Feldstein M. and Green J., 
1983; Baker K. H., Farrelly G. E. and Edelman R. B., 1985), which try to explain investor 
behavior, are alternative methods used to explain any queries about dividends paid to 
the shareholders by corporations. 
In the recent years, there is an attempt by professionals and academics to combine 
all the existing theories with ownership characteristics, in order to give further answers 
to questions relating to corporate dividend policy. There are researches, though, focus-
ing on the control that large shareholders can exercise in publicly traded firms as they 
have an incentive to monitor management due to their concentrated power (Shleifer A. 
and Vishny R. W., 1986). However, if large investors get more control rights than cash 
flow rights, there is a chance that minority shareholders will be expropriated (Faccio M. 
and Lang L. H. P., 2002).  
Jensen M. and Meckling W. (1976), in their attempt to develop a theory which would 
deal with the ownership structure of the corporations, define the agency relationship as 
a contract by which the one party called the agent is entitled by the other party called 
the principal to act on their behalf and make some decisions. However, there is a possi-
bility, according to the authors, that the agent does not act in the interest of the princi-
pal, but tries to maximize their own wealth. In other words, separation of ownership 
and control may cause problems known as agency problem. In some countries, the 
agency problem may not be the result of a conflict between managers, who are usually 
the decision makers, and the shareholders, who are the owners of the corporations, 
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according to Shleifer A. and Vishny R. W. (1997). In their paper they support that a con-
flict, between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders may, also, create 
agency problem, especially when the ownership of a corporation is concentrated. Vil-
lalonga B. and Amit R. (2006), in their paper, refer to these problems as Agency Problem 
I and Agency Problem II, respectively. 
Furthermore, the identity of large shareholders (family, bank, institutional investor, 
government etc) can determine the corporate strategy concerning profit targets, divi-
dends, capital structure and growth rates, as well as affect the firm’s performance 
(Thomsen S and Pedersen T., 2000). Andres C. (2008) suggests that families as large 
shareholders can be considered as a remedy to the two agency problems that minority 
shareholders have to face. According to the author, though, this type of ownership is 
not always suitable for corporations and only under certain conditions can improve 
firm’s performance. 
Greek listed firms belong to a special category compared to many other listed firms 
all over the world, because they operate under such a legal regime that they have the 
obligation to pay a minimum dividend to their shareholders when they report profits.  
Another characteristic of Greek firms is that they have a high degree of ownership con-
centration, as many other European countries, with founding families being often in 
control (Spanos L. J., 2005).  
The purpose of the current analysis is to investigate how controlling shareholders 
may influence a Greek listed firm’s decision to pay more or less than the minimum divi-
dend required by law. The focus is set on the influence of the founding families which, 
in many cases, hold significant proportion of the company’s shares and the linearity of 
the relation between this ownership and the dividend payments. The results demon-
strate that founding family shareholding of up to 57.2449% is negatively related to divi-
dend payments, but beyond this level it increases dividend payments, meaning that the 
existing relationship is not linear. Furthermore, increases in the stake that the founding 
family holds in a company are related to higher probability that the company pays lower 
dividends than what it is required to pay by law when it reports profits. 
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The remainder of this work is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the Greek leg-
islative framework with respect to dividend payments. Section 3 presents prior litera-
ture related to dividend policy and ownership structure and develops the hypotheses 
tested in order to identify potential impacts of family ownership on dividend policies. 
Section 4 describes the data and the model designed. Section 5 provides a discussion on 
the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, section 6 summarises and concludes the 
dissertation. 
 
2. Legal background 
Martins T. C. and Novaes W.  (2010) suggest that, there are only five civil-law coun-
tries, including Greece, where mandatory dividend legislation applies. This legislation 
sets the framework for the payment of dividends to the shareholders of profitable Greek 
corporations. 
2.1 Law 2190/1920 
The basis for the legislation relating to corporations with the legal form of a Société 
Anonyme (S.A.) is the Greek law 2190/1920. The importance of this law is evidenced by 
the fact that many of its articles apply for many years almost unchangeable. Law 
2190/1920 was codified in a single text by the Royal Decree 174/1963 (Official Govern-
ment Gazette Issue A No. 37 – 30/03/1963) divided into ten chapters. Chapter five de-
scribes how earnings can be distributed. Article 45 of this chapter in the first paragraph 
defines net income as the gross income minus any expenses, losses, depreciation and 
other burdens imposed on corporations. The second paragraph of this article refers to 
the distribution of this net income, where one part of it is retained as statutory reserve 
and another part as first dividend. This first dividend has to be at least 6% of the money 
that the corporation receives from its shareholders in exchange for shares. The remain-
ing amount is distributed based on the articles of incorporation. 
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2.2 Law 148/197 
On October 9, 1967 a law relating to measures for the strengthening of capital mar-
kets was published. Law 148/1967 (Official Government Gazette Issue A No. 173 – 
09/10/1967) comprises 13 articles. Article 3 of the aforesaid law refers to the distribu-
tion of earnings to the shareholders of corporations. In particular, it defines that all cor-
porations with the legal form of a S.A. are obliged to pay every year to their shareholders 
part of the net income (not less than 30%) as dividends after extracting the amount of 
reserves that has to be retained by law. This provision applies in cases when the distrib-
utable earnings of article 3 are higher than those mentioned in Law 2190/1920 article 
45 paragraph 2. The corporation can decide to pay shareholders either in cash or by new 
shares (in whole or in part) which will increase their share capital.  
The law, also, provides that the general meeting of the shareholders, by a majority of 
3/4 of votes, has the right to decide whether paragraph 1 of the law will not be applied. 
In any other occasion, absolute majority is required for the decision of the general meet-
ing on the distribution of earnings. 
The minimum dividend required by law gives outside investors, such as minority 
shareholders the right to receive same dividends as the controlling shareholders, to vote 
on issues of great importance and sue the company in case of damage (La Porta R., 
Lopez-des-Silanes F., Shleifer A. and Vishny R.W., 2000). In other words, it acts as a cure 
to agency problems helping minority shareholders to safeguard their interests which 
may be threatened by insiders and helps capital market become stronger. 
2.3 Amendments 
During the prior years, many articles of Law 2190/1920 and Law 148/1967 have been 
amended or changed completely. Article 3 of Law 148/1967 was replaced by artcle 1 of 
Law 876/1979 (Official Government Gazette Issue A No. 48 – 12/03/1979) which states 
that the amount distributed in cash to shareholders has to be at least 35% of net income 
free of any statutory reserves. This provision applies in the same cases as provided for 
by law 148/1967, but there is no application if this is decided by a majority of 80% of 
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paid-up capital in the annual general meeting of shareholders. In this case the undistrib-
uted dividends (at least the amount prescribed by law) will be capitalised. All provisions 
shall not apply if the annual general meeting of shareholders by a majority of paid-up 
capital of 95% decides so. 
Another change occurred in 1999, when Law 2753 (Official Government Gazette Issue 
A No. 249 – 17/11/1999) was published. More specifically, the provisions of article 3 
paragraph 18 Law 2753/1999 replaced paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 1 Law 876/1979. 
This paragraph states that a majority of shareholders controlling at least 65% of the sub-
scribed capital is able to decide not to apply the provisions of paragraph 1 of article 1 
Law 876/1979. In this case, the undistributed dividends until the minimum dividend re-
quirement as described by law (35% of net income) can be transferred to special reserve 
account for capitalisation. A majority of shareholders controlling 70% of the subscribed 
capital can decide in the general meeting of shareholders not to apply the provisions of 
paragraph 1 and paragraph 2 as amended by Law 2753. 
Some years after the replacement of paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 1 Law 876/1979, 
article 25 of Law 2789/2000 (Official Government Gazette Issue A No. 21 – 11/12/2000) 
replaced paragraph 1, as well, resulting to the final shaping of the article. Article 25 men-
tions that corporations shall distribute to the shareholders at least 35% of net income in 
cash after deducting only the amount retained as statutory reserve and any profits de-
riving from the sale of shares which are held for at least ten years and represent more 
than 20% participation in the subscribed capital of a subsidiary. Again this provision ap-
plies when the resulting distributable profits are higher than those determined in para-
graph 2 of article 45 Law 2190/1920 as codified by the Royal Decree 174/1963. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the role of Law 2190/1920 is important 
for the proper functioning of corporations, because it lays the foundations for the proper 
distribution of earnings which has further implications to the relationship between 
shareholders and the functioning of capital markets. However, a new law published on 
August 8, 2007 reformed 2190/1920 in order to incorporate the Directive 2006/68/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006 amending Council 
Directive 77/91/EEC, as regards the formation of public limited liability companies and 
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the maintenance and alteration of their capital and, in part, the Directive 2003/58/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2003 amending Council Directive 
68/151/EEC, as regards disclosure requirements in respect of certain types of compa-
nies. The new Law 3604/2007 (Official Government Gazette Issue A No. 189 – 
08/08/2007) consists of fifteen chapters with a total of eighty two articles. Article 54 
replaced article 45 of Law 2190/1920 and states that the point of paragraph 2 article 45, 
which refers to the amount of net income that shall be distributed to shareholders, is 
replaced by a new provision that defines as the necessary amount retained for dividend 
payments the amount established by article 3 Law 148/1967. 
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3. Literature review and hypotheses 
There is much interest expressed by researchers the previous years, regarding found-
ing families, their characteristics as owners of a company and their influence on its op-
erations and performance. Keeping or not an active role, the founders or their heirs 
many times have the control of the company and can play a key role regarding some 
important decisions for the company’s future. 
3.1 Literature review 
Family control characterizes a number of listed firms all over the world (La Porta R., 
Lopez-des-Silanes F. and Shleifer A., 1999; Burkart M., Panunzi F. and Shleifer A., 2003). 
Anderson R. C. and Reeb D. M. (2003) investigated the existence of family ownership in 
the S&P 500 in the U.S. which reaches, according to their findings, about the one-third 
of the firms. A study regarding Canada, which have the same common-law system with 
the U.S., reports less widely held firms for the former country and more family con-
trolled (King M. R. and Santor E., 2008). The figures of the Canadian firms appear in the 
study closer to those Asian and European. 
Claessens S., Djankov S. and Lang L. H. P. (2000) who examined a sample of 2,980 
corporations in nine countries of East Asia, noticed that in most of the developing coun-
tries under scrutiny few families collect an important amount of corporate wealth, but 
family-controlled firms are mainly those established in the earliest years indicating a 
change in the ownership structure. Other researchers focused their study on specific 
Asian countries. More specifically, Saito T. (2008), using data from 1818 listed Japanese 
firms, concluded that founding families are a common and significant category of share-
holders and top-level managers with almost 38% of the sample firms being family firms. 
The same applies in Korea, where the dominant structure is chaebol, which is family 
based (Chang S. J., 2003). According to Solomon J., Solomon A. and Park C.Y. (2002), 
family ownership and control have been characteristics of the Korean corporate sector 
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for many years. Taiwanese listed firms are, also, typical examples of this as families re-
main powerful and have active participation in the decision-making process even after 
the firms become public (Yeh Y. H., Lee T. S. and Woidtke T., 2001). 
Regarding large European corporations, more important appear to be those with a 
more dispersed ownership, whereas for small corporations families play a great role 
(Faccio M. and Lang L. H. P., 2002). Especially in Western Europe, families and business 
groups controlled by families are almost equally important as in Asia (Faccio M., Lang L. 
H. P. and Young L., 2001). 
Τhere is clear evidence that family based structures represent a significant proportion 
all over the world and influence a corporation’s decisions due to their power. But in 
what extent is a corporation’s dividend policy determined by the fact that it is controlled 
by the founding family? Do founding families increase dividend payments in order to 
control management and agency costs of free cash flow (Shleifer A. and Vishny R., 1986) 
or they choose to get private benefits and lower dividends because dividends enhance 
minority shareholders wealth as well (Faccio M., Lang L. and Young L., 2001; Harada K. 
and Nguyen P., 2011)? 
These questions raise the interest of many analysts. Dewnter K. L. and Warther V. A. 
(1998) compare the payout policy of Japanese and U.S. firms based on the hypothesis 
that Japanese firms face less information asymmetry and agency conflicts than U.S firms 
as they are more concentrated and family-controlled and that these two can affect the 
payout policy. Maury C. B. and Pajuste A. (2002) analyzed a sample of 133 Finnish listed 
firms and concluded that payout ratios have a negative relation to the control stake of 
the controlling shareholder who, in about 65% of the sample firms, is a family or an 
unlisted firm. Their results, also, showed that each owner type affects in a different way 
the dividend policy of the firms and that the most powerful shareholders may try to 
achieve economic gains through collusion at the expense of small shareholders. In their 
study about Hong Kong firms, Chen Z., Cheung Y. L., Stouraitis A. and Wong A. (2005) 
found little relationship between family ownership and payout policy but, only for small 
firms there is a negative relationship of up to 10% of the firm’s stock and a positive be-
tween 10% and 35%. This may imply that, in smaller corporations, families as controlling 
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shareholders use dividends in order to take advantage of the firm’s resources or owners-
managers are more concerned about dividends than their salary which is on average 
lower or investors anticipate the potential expropriation by asking for higher dividends 
as some firms are more prone to agency conflicts. 
A common example of a country with corporations that have highly concentrated 
ownership is Italy. Mancinelli L. and Ozkan A. (2006) examined a sample of 139 Italian 
listed firms and the results revealed that there is a negative effect of the voting rights of 
the largest shareholder on the dividend payments meaning that an increase in voting 
rights contributes to lower payments. The impact of the largest shareholder on the div-
idend policy of a corporation is, also, evident in the study of Truong N. and Heaney R. 
(2007) on 8,279 listed firms from 37 countries which demonstrate that the largest share-
holder may appear as a substitute for dividend payouts and reduce agency costs. An-
other country with a big number of corporations characterized by a concentrated own-
ership structure, is Malaysia. According to Ramli N. M. (2010), the Malaysian corpora-
tions which are controlled by a large shareholder, either a family or the Government, 
pay out more dividends, meaning that in this country emphasis is given on the avoidance 
of conflicts between the owner and the management. The same conclusion appears in 
the study of Adjaoud F. and Ben-Amar W. (2010) about firms listed on the Toronto stock 
exchange.  
Detailed examination on founding firms was performed by Isakov D. and Weisskopf 
J. P. (2015) who analysed a number of Swiss firms. Based on some hypotheses, they 
noticed that dividend payments have a positive relationship to the size of the stake the 
founding family owns and that the family firms that pay out higher dividends are the 
older firms at the descendant stage with no family members in the Board of Directors 
or the management team and no second blockholder. In addition to that, they find rela-
tionship between the dividend policy and any concerns the family may have about the 
reputation of the firm, as well as, the fact that the family invested much of its wealth in 
the firm. The rate that family firms pay out as dividends, according to the study, is 37.5% 
of earnings, whereas non-family firms 13% less. 
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The preferences of families, the benefits they extract and the limited ability of their 
claims to be traded make this ownership structure seem less effective, as reported by 
Anderson R. and Reeb D. (2003). On the other hand, the same researchers consider the 
long term perspective, the family loyalty and the reputation concerns as characteristics 
of the families that influence a firm positively.  
Although the legal system in many countries does not protect minority shareholders 
against agency problems, large shareholders can pledge themselves not to expropriate 
this category of shareholders (Gomes A., 2000). DeAngelo H. and DeAngelo L. (2000) in 
their analysis indicate that the preferences of the controlling family can have a signifi-
cant impact on the dividend policy. But, according to Anderson R. C., Mansi S. A. and 
Reeb D. M. (2003), family shareholders have greater chances to adhere to maximization 
of the corporation’s wealth for its survival because not only they invest a large propor-
tion of their wealth in the corporation, but they, also, want to pass the firm to their 
descendants and, at the same time, feel anxious for maintaining a good family and cor-
porate reputation. In the same paper, Anderson R., Mansi S. and Reeb D. support that 
the long-term ownership of the family in a corporation and the way it affects third par-
ties cause reputation concerns. The desire of family owners to control a firm that will 
survive for a long period at all costs and take decisions that keep stable the nature of 
the business, makes them be risk averse (Audretsch D., Hülsbeck M. and Lehmann E., 
2013). Many Greek firms and especially some which are very successful are family 
owned, founded and still managed by the founder (Voudouris I., Lioukas S., Makridakis 
S. and Spanos Y., 2000).  
The central question of this work is the relation between founding families and divi-
dend policy of corporations in Greece. The current investigation provides an analysis of 
this relation using firm level data on Greek firms listed in the Athens Stock Exchange. In 
general, the Greek stock market is described by low dispersion of shares and strict family 
control, which is evidenced by the fact that 65% of the top 20 listed firms are controlled 
by a family (Konstantaras K. and Siriopoulos C., 2011). 
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3.2 Hypotheses development 
There is no doubt that, the agency theory has influenced many analysts worldwide 
during their examination of the dividend policy helping them draw the attention to spe-
cific issues regarding ownership characteristics and peculiarities. Taken from the agency 
literature, the entrenchment hypothesis tries to explain the opportunistic behaviour of 
large blockholders who, due to their power may try to extract control benefits at the 
expense of minority shareholders and, consequently, prevent investments and external 
intervention which would, otherwise, affect firm’s value positively (Chahine S., 2007; 
Yeh L. J. and Kuo H. C., 2015; Claessens S., Djankov S., Fan J. and Lang L., 2002). They can 
achieve this, by disclosing limited or misleading information and restricting firm trans-
parency, so that outsiders will not be able to oversee their activities (Anderson R. C., 
Duru A. and Reeb D. M., 2009).  
As far as the dividend policy of a company is concerned, Farinha J. (2003) suggests 
that below a certain level called “entrenchment level” insider ownership and dividend 
policy can be handled as being substitute techniques of corporate governance with a 
negative relationship. After this level any increase in ownership is expected to increase 
agency costs (Schooley D. K. and Barney Jr L. D., 1994). At the same time, dividend policy 
may work as a monitoring mechanism and any increase in ownership will tend to in-
crease dividend pay-outs, creating, in the end, a U-shaped relationship between owner-
ship and dividend policy (Farinha J., 2003; Da Silva L. C., Goergen M. and Renneboog L., 
2004).  Based on this, the first hypothesis is formed as follows: 
 Hypothesis 1 (H1). The dividend payments are negatively related to founding 
family ownership below an entrenchment level and positively related above that 
level. 
Dividends may represent a great part of the income large shareholders receive from 
corporations they control (Chen Z., Cheung Y. L., Stouraitis A. and Wong A., 2005). Sta-
tistically the family stake in a corporation does not change significantly through the 
years and from one generation to another which means that in order to finance private 
consumption family members, who are not managers and do not have a salary, prefer 
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receiving dividends instead of selling shares and, consequently, losing control (Andres 
C., 2008). Hence, the second hypothesis is the following: 
 Hypothesis 2 (H2). Family firms meet the income needs of family owners by pay-
ing more dividends than the Minimum Dividend Requirement. 
 
4. Data description and methodology 
Based on prior literature, the current analysis tries to give answers to questions re-
garding the decisions of Greek listed firms to pay a certain amount of earnings as divi-
dend and the influence that founding families have on these decisions. This can be 
achieved through the development of statistical models and procedures, along with the 
collection of the necessary data which helps form these models. The type of data 
gathered and the methods used to analyse this data are explained in this section. 
4.1 Sample 
The sample tested consists of 210 entities listed on the Athens Stock Exchange be-
tween the years 2008 and 2014. The selected sample period begins with 2008, which 
was the year the economic crisis erupted in Greece. Due to the crisis, the numbers be-
fore and after 2008 may vary to a great extent. In order to keep the latest data and 
produce reliable results, data from prior years were omitted. The total firm-year obser-
vations are 1353. 
The ownership structure data play a key role because the analysis is based on found-
ing families and the stake they hold in their companies. For the collection of these data 
Athens Stock Exchange’s database is mainly used, along with each company’s official 
website where much information can be found regarding the people that founded the 
company, participate in governing bodies, work as directors or just hold some of its 
shares. This information is necessary for matching the stakes with the right category of 
holders which can be 1) the founding family, 2) private investor(s), 3) the State, 4) an 
industrial corporation, 5) a financial corporation and 6) miscellaneous. The Athens Stock 
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Exchange database provides information for the shareholders that possess more than 
5% of a company’s shares. When there are many shareholders owning less than 5% of 
shares each, they are not expected to exercise considerable influence individually. 
Accounting data and data of the financial performance of each entity are, also, gath-
ered from the annual reports through hand collection, as well as the Hellastat database 
for the years 2008-2014, in order to complete this process. All the numbers used to per-
form the tests refer to the single entity and not the group accounts. 
4.2 Shareholders categories 
According to Thomsen S. and Pedersen T. (2000), ownership structure can be meas-
ured well enough in European companies by the share and identity of the largest share-
holder because European companies are generally characterised as concentrated. 
Founding families may have one or more family members holding a certain amount of 
shares in the companies they have founded. A private investor is an individual that has 
not founded the company, but holds a proportion of its shares. Industrial corporations 
are companies participating in other companies, but their main shareholders are not 
dominant shareholders in the companies that industrial corporations have a stake. Fi-
nancial corporations is a category that includes banks. Other types of shareholders, such 
as foundations and funds, fall into the miscellaneous category.  
In order to determine which shareholders exercise control, Claessens S. Djankov S 
and Lang L. (2000), set as cutoff point the 20% voting rights. Table 1 shows how many of 
the sample firms have as controlling shareholder one or more individuals or entities fall-
ing into the categories analysed above taking as cutoff point the 20% voting rights. The 
companies that have more than one controlling shareholder with more than 20% voting 
rights are reported in the category of the controlling shareholder with the higher stake, 
while there are companies which have no controlling shareholder. The companies with 
no controlling shareholder are characterized as widely held. 
Even though, the total number of companies in the sample is 210, some of them went 
public after 2008 or were delisted before 2014. For this reason, the total number of 
companies for each year is lower than 210, as is demonstrated in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Firms with controlling shareholders 
YEAR 
Founding 
Family 
Private 
Investor State 
Industrial 
Corporation 
Financial 
Corporation Miscellaneous 
Widely 
held Total 
2008 115 26 8 22 8 13 11 203 
2009 116 25 7 20 9 15 13 205 
2010 114 27 7 21 9 16 12 206 
2011 115 28 7 20 9 17 12 208 
2012 113 30 7 19 9 16 13 207 
2013 114 31 6 19 3 28 7 208 
2014 115 31 6 18 4 28 6 208 
Total 802 198 48 139 51 133 74 1445 
Notes: The sample consists of 210 firms for the period 2008-2014. There are six categories of 
controlling shareholders for the same period. Controlling shareholders own more than 20% vot-
ing rights. Widely held companies do not have a controlling shareholder.  
 
Based on the numbers demonstrated in the above table, almost 55% of the sample 
companies are owned by the founding families during the period 2008-2014. Regarding 
the rest categories, 13% have one or more private investors holding large amounts of 
shares, almost 3% are owned by the State and 9% by an industrial corporation. Further-
more, 3% have as large shareholder a financial corporation and 9% do not fall in any of 
the previous categories, but have other types of large shareholders. Changes in the num-
bers from one year to another are not very significant for most of the categories.  
Moreover, in 2008 there are 22 entities out of the 203 that have controlling share-
holders of two different categories. This number becomes 24 out of 205 in 2009 and 26 
out of 206 in 2010. There is a further increase in 2011 to 30 entities out of 208 and this 
number remains stable in 2012. Finally, in 2013 there is another increase from 30 to 32 
out of 208 and in 2014 they decrease to 31out of 208. It is worth mentioning that during 
the whole period there is no entity with controlling shareholders that fall into more than 
two different categories. 
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4.3 Model 
The main concern of this work is to explain whether any deviations from the Mini-
mum Dividend Requirement a Greek listed company should pay, may be the result of 
the participation of its founders in the shareholder composition. In order to achieve this, 
data is collected in the form of an unbalanced panel of 210 companies and 1353 firm-
year observations for the years 2008-2014.  
4.3.1 Entrenchment hypothesis model 
As noted above, large shareholders have sometimes a tendency to use their power 
in such a way that they can extract a control premium at the expense of minority share-
holders (Chahine S., 2007) and that, after an entrenchment level, ownership and divi-
dend pay-outs will be positively related. In other words, entrenchment occurs when the 
sign of the partial derivative of ownership changes from negative to positive (Schooley 
D. K. and Barney Jr L. D., 1994). 
The model used to test the entrenchment hypothesis is a basic model applied by 
many researchers in their analysis (Sciascia S. and Mazzola P., 2008; Navissi F and Naiker 
V., 2006; Farihna J, 2003). As the relation between ownership and dividend pay-outs is 
assumed not to be linear, but U-shaped, the general form of the model used for the 
purpose of this analysis will be the following polynomial of degree 2: 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 = 𝛼 + 𝛿1𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑖,𝑡
2 + ∑ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 
                                                     + ∑ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + ∑ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        
where i  is a company dimension and t  is a time dimension. Dividend to assets is the 
dependent variable of the model expressing the dividend payments of the company as 
a percentage of its assets. The family stake is an explanatory variable of ownership that 
represents the proportion of shares the founding family owns to the company. The con-
trol variables of the model are all the categories of controlling shareholders apart from 
the founding family, the Return on Asset (ROA), the natural logarithm of the company’s 
age (ln(age)), the natural logarithm of the company’s assets (ln(size)), the leverage as it 
is described by the debt ratio, the sales growth and the family name dummy which 
(1) 
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equals 1 when the family name is used as company name and 0 otherwise. There are, 
also, industry and year dummy variables that equal 1 when the company falls into the 
corresponding industry or year and 0 otherwise. The industry categorization used is the 
one proposed by the Athens Stock Exchange. 
As proposed by Da Silva L. C., Goergen M. and Renneboog L. (2004), in order to find 
out the entrenchment level, there is a need to discover what the minimum of the func-
tion described above is. For this purpose, we differentiate dividend to assets with re-
spect to the proportion of shares held by the founding family, considering all other var-
iables as constants, and set the partial derivative equal to 0. The mathematical formula-
tion is the following: 
𝜕(𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)
𝜕(𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒)
= 0 
By solving the equation, the result obtained shows which is the entrenchment level 
for the current analysis. 
4.3.2 Ownership structure model 
Another issue presented in section 3 is that founding family members many times 
keep high amounts of shares without selling them in order to satisfy their income needs 
through the dividends they receive and not lose control of the company. The model used 
to test this assertion is influenced by the research of Isakov D. and Weisskopf J. P (2015).  
The two researchers, who analysed the influence that founding families exercise to 
the dividend policy of the Swiss listed firms for the period 2003-2010, used a random-
effect Tobit model of the form: 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦 − 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝜑𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑗,𝑡 + 𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑗,𝑡 
                                               + 𝛾𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡                                                                                                                      
where j  is a company dimension and t  is a time dimension. The family firm variable they 
use is a dummy variable that takes into account various characteristics of the founding 
family firms. The control variables they use are wedge, Tobin’s Q, ROIC, firm age, firm 
(2) 
(3) 
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size, leverage, sales growth and beta. Apart from the control variables, their model in-
cludes industry and year dummy variables that equal 1 when the company falls into the 
corresponding industry or year and 0 otherwise. 
Following the work of these researchers, the model used for the analysis is a random-
effect probit model as the depend variable is a dummy variable which takes the values 
1 or 0 based on whether the dividend paid is lower or higher than the prescribed Mini-
mum Dividend Requirement. Its general form is the following: 
𝐷𝑀𝐷𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝛽1𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3ln (𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4ln (𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
      +𝛽6𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 
+ ∑ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                        
where i  is the company dimension and t  is the time dimension, similarly to the model 
of Isakov D. and Weisskopf J. P.. DMDR is the dependent dummy variable mentioned 
above which indicates the decision of the company to pay to shareholders more or less 
than the Minimum Dividend Requirement. The family stake represents again the pro-
portion of shares that the founding family owns to the company. The control variables, 
as well as the industry and year dummy variables of the model are the same as the ones 
used in the entrenchment hypothesis model.  
A limitation of the model applied can be considered the fact that there are no clusters 
for standard errors at the firm level. Clusters could indicate that there is some kind of 
relation among the standard errors of each firm (Thompson S. B., 2011). This grouping 
process can be done as a sensitivity analysis in future research. 
 
 
 
(4) 
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5. Empirical results 
In the previous section, there is a description of the methodology used in the current 
analysis, as well as a presentation of the models applied. This is the section that deals 
with the results of the analysis and explains the relations arising. The statistical software 
used for this purpose is the Stata/IC 13.1. 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
The summary of some descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis ap-
pears in Table 2. The average dividend payment is 0.61% of the assets. The companies 
of the sample have an average age of 37 years and average size of €2,034,281,400. Fur-
thermore, the average Return on Asset is -4.6%, the average leverage 58% and the av-
erage sales growth -7%.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Median Minimum Maximum St.dev. p25 p75 Observ. 
Dividend/assets 0.0061 0.0000 0.0000 0.5235 0.0278 0.0000 0.0000 1,425 
Minimum Dividend 
Requirement dummy 0.2582 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4378 0.0000 1.0000 1,425 
         
Founding family 0.3319 0.3266 0.0000 0.8734 0.3092 0.0000 0.6365 1,445 
Private investor 0.0960 0.0000 0.0000 0.9438 0.1906 0.0000 0.0982 1,445 
State 0.0220 0.0000 0.0000 0.7500 0.1130 0.0000 0.0000 1,445 
Industrial corporation 0.0632 0.0000 0.0000 0.9436 0.1716 0.0000 0.0000 1,445 
Financial corporation 0.0345 0.0000 0.0000 0.9840 0.1380 0.0000 0.0000 1,445 
Miscellaneous 0.0856 0.0000 0.0000 0.9727 0.1965 0.0000 0.0556 1,445 
         
Return on Asset -0.0461 -0.01107 -2.41513 0.56382 0.0278 -0.0665 0.0161 1,422 
Firm age (in years) 36.7286 32.0000 6.0000 173.0000 21.6329 22.0000 44.0000 1,425 
Firm size (in million 
euros) 2,034.2814 86.1525 0.9474 99,856.0000 1,070.0000 36.4005 247.6226 1,425 
Firm age (ln) 3.4612 3.4657 1.7918 5.1533 0.5160 3.0910 3.7842 1,425 
Firm size (ln) 18.5171 18.2705 8.1620 25.3270 1.7886 17.4101 19.3274 1,425 
Leverage 0.5758 0.5600 0.0000 3.97234 0.3501 0.3657 0.7303 1,417 
Sales growth -0.0687 -0.0520 -3.4896 4.1483 0.4006 -0.1976 0.0660 1,368 
Family name 0.2571 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4372 0.0000 1.0000 1,445 
Notes: The table includes the descriptive statistics of the sample which consists of 210 firms for 
the period 2008-2014. The pay-out variables are dividend/assets and the Minimum Dividend 
Requirement dummy. Ownership variables are labelled based on the identity of the controlling 
shareholder of the companies. The control variables are Return on Asset, the firm age and its 
natural logarithm, the firm size (total assets) and its natural logarithm, the leverage (total 
debt/total assets), sales growth and family name which is related to the company’s reputation. 
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Table 2 shows the overall picture, as it refers to all the firms of the sample. Even more 
interesting are the statistics if we divide the companies in two groups, those which are 
controlled by the founding families and those which are not. The results are presented 
in Table 3.  
Table 3: Family and non-family firms’ statistics 
Panel A: Family firms descriptive statistics             
Family firms         
  Mean Median Minimum Maximum St. dev. p25 p75 Observ. 
Dividend to assets 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0735 0.0099 0.0000 0.0000 839 
Minimum Dividend          
Requirement dummy 0.2837 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4510 0.0000 1.0000 839 
         
Return on Asset -0.0551 -0.0170 -2.4151 0.5347 0.1769 -0.0792 0.0142 837 
Firm age (in years) 30.9344 28.0000 7.0000 87.0000 12.6382 22.0000 37.0000 839 
Firm size (in million euros) 136.1665 59.2048 0.0000 1,407.9460 199.0912 29.1795 145.9500 839 
Firm age (ln) 3.3550 3.3322 1.9459 4.4659 0.3840 3.0910 3.6109 839 
Firm size (ln) 17.9808 17.8973 8.1620 21.0654 1.2881 17.1907 18.7991 839 
Leverage 0.6069 0.5719 0.0197 3.0818 0.3454 0.3895 0.7262 834 
Sales growth -0.0777 -0.0608 -1.0575 3.1896 0.3297 -0.1976 0.0553 817 
Family name 0.4103 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4922 0.0000 1.0000 848 
Panel B: Non-family firms descriptive statistics          
Non-family firms             
  Mean Median Minimum Maximum St. dev. p25 p75 Observ. 
Dividend to assets 0.0106 0.0000 0.0000 0.5235 0.0414 0.0000 0.0004 586 
Minimum Dividend          
Requirement dummy 0.2205 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.4149 0.0000 0.0000 586 
         
Return on Asset -0.0334 -0.0070 -2.0691 0.5638 0.1654 -0.0457 0.0174 585 
Firm age (in years) 44.7614 40.0000 6.0000 173.0000 28.0187 22.0000 55.0000 585 
Firm size (in million euros) 4,752.8250 149.0833 0.9473 99,856.0000 16,300.0000 56.7730 502.6550 585 
Firm age (ln) 3.6148 3.6889 1.7918 5.1533 0.6301 3.0910 3.9890 585 
Firm size (ln) 19.2898 18.8200 13.7614 25.3270 2.0979 17.8546 20.0354 585 
Leverage 0.5324 0.5509 0.0000 3.9723 0.3524 0.2653 0.7359 583 
Sales growth -0.0555 -0.0395 -3.4896 4.1483 0.4876 -0.2013 0.0789 551 
Family name 0.0455 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.2085 0.0000 0.0000 597 
Notes: The table includes the descriptive statistics of family controlled firms (Panel A) and firms 
not controlled by the founding family (Panel B). The pay-out variables are dividend/assets and 
the Minimum Dividend Requirement dummy. The control variables are Return on Asset, the firm 
age and its natural logarithm, the firm size (total assets) and its natural logarithm, the leverage 
(total debt/total assets), sales growth and family name which is related to the company’s repu-
tation. 
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On average the entities which are under the founding family control pay slightly lower 
dividends than the entities which are controlled by other types of shareholders. The lat-
ter are older in age with higher Return on Asset, much higher size and more sales 
growth. On the other hand, founding family firms have higher leverage showing their 
preference for borrowing than equity financing. This comes in contrast with the opinion 
that families want to reduce risk and choose to finance their activities in such a way that 
will not cause them concerns about their ability to fulfill their obligation, like equity fi-
nancing which is a safer choice (Anderson R. C. and Reeb D. M., 2003). 
In addition, at least 75% of the number of observations regarding dividend to assets 
variable of family firms equals to zero showing that few companies decided to pay divi-
dends during the period of examination. This percentage seems to be lower for non-
family firms compared to family firms, but significant as it reaches at least 50%. 
5.2 Dividend and family participation 
This part of the analysis attempts to specify the type of relationship between dividend 
payments and founding family ownership by applying model (1). The regression results 
obtained from Stata are shown in Table 4. In columns A, B and C the numbers represent 
the coefficients of each variable in the model and the numbers in parentheses are the 
values of the test statistic. The significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level is demonstrated by 
***, ** and *, respectively. 
In column A, the coefficient of the founding family stake variable is negative and sta-
tistically insignificant, while in column B it is negative, but statistically significant at the 
1% level. Statistically significant at the 1% level is, also, the square of family stake. In 
column C, some more control variables are added compared to column B. The founding 
family stake variable and its square are statistically significant at 1% level in this case as 
well and the model that is formed seems to be more accurate than the one with less 
control variables. This is easily understood due to the fact that the Adjusted R2 in column 
C is higher than the one in column B. 
The number of observations remains unchanged in all three case. Industry and year 
dummies were, also, used in all three regressions. 
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Table 4: Regression results for the entrenchment hypothesis model 
Dependent Variable:        
Dividend/Assets A B C 
    
Explanatory variables:    
Founding family stake -0.0047 -0.0295*** -0.0561*** 
 (-1.5900) (-2.9900) (-4.3600) 
(Founding family stake) 2  0.0335*** 0.0490*** 
  (2.6400) (3.6300) 
Private investor   -0.0262*** 
   (-4.0500) 
State   0.0758*** 
   (8.0900) 
Industrial corporation   -0.0213*** 
   (-3.5100) 
Financial corporation   -0.0128* 
   (-1.9400) 
Miscellaneous   -0.0161*** 
   (-2.9100) 
ROA 0.0425*** 0.0422*** 0.0408*** 
 (8.7900) (8.7500) (8.8500) 
Ln(age) -0.0015 -0.0019 -0.0007 
 (-0.9000) (-1.1500) (-0.4500) 
Ln(size) 0.0019*** 0.0020*** 0.0008 
 (2.9100) (2.9700) (1.1400) 
Leverage 0.0033* 0.0035** 0.0041** 
 (1.8500) (2.0000) (2.4100) 
Sales growth 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 (-0.4500) (-0.4900) (-0.4700) 
Family name -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0005 
 (-0.4500) (-0.5300) (-0.2800) 
Intercept -0.0264 -0.0218 0.0111 
 (-1.4900) (-1.2200) (0.6100) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.1180 0.1220 0.1991 
Observations 1353 1353 1353 
Notes: This table reports the results of the regressions using dividend/assets as the depend var-
iable for firm-year observations from the years 2008-2014. The sample consists of 1353 firm-
year observations. The models estimated are, for all specifications: Dividend/assets = f(x), where 
x are the variables related to each specification. The numbers in parenthesis are the values of 
the test statistic. ***, ** and * show the significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. All 
numbers are rounded up to the forth decimal place. 
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The results above support the entrenchment hypothesis, indicating that there is a 
level after which founding family ownership and dividend pay-outs are positively re-
lated. This level can be now easily estimated for the sample firms. 
Considering the coefficients of column B (Table 4), model (1) becomes: 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 = −0.0295𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 + 0.0335(𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒)2  + 0.0422𝑅𝑂𝐴 
 +0.0020 ln(𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒) + 0.0035𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒          
The next step is to set the partial derivative equal to zero in order to estimate what 
the entrenchment level is. Model (2) becomes: 
𝜕(𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)
𝜕(𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒)
= −0.0295 + 2 ∗ 0.0335𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 = 0 
After solving the equation, the result obtained is 44.0299%. This is the ownership 
cutoff point after which agency costs are expected to be higher as the family stake in-
creases and this causes further increases in dividends which work as monitoring mech-
anism. 
If we use the coefficients of column C (Table 4), the model we get is: 
 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 = −0.0561𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒 + 0.0490(𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒)2   − 0.0262 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟 
    +0.0758𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 0.0213𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝 − 0.0128 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑝 
−0.0161𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑜𝑢𝑠 + 0.0408𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 0.0041𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒             
and setting the partial derivative equal to zero, the entrenchment level is 57.2449%. This 
is a more accurate estimation because, as mentioned before, the Adjusted R2 is higher 
in this case. 
5.3 Dividend and ownership structure 
One of the issues under scrutiny is the relation between higher or lower dividend 
payments than the Minimum Dividend Requirement and ownership structure of the 
companies listed in the Athens Stock Exchange. The results of the regression appear in 
Table 5. As this is a probit model, when the coefficients are positive, an increase in the 
explanatory variable is expected to increase the probability that the dependent variable 
will equal 1, indicating that dividend payments are lower than the minimum required.  
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
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In columns A, B and C the numbers represent the coefficients of each variable in the 
model and the numbers in parentheses are the values of the test statistic. The signifi-
cance at 1%, 5% and 10% level is demonstrated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
Table 5: Regression results for the ownership structure model 
Dependent Variable:        
Minimum Dividend Requirement A B C 
    
Explanatory variables:    
Founding family 0.6602*** 1.0366*** 1.0525*** 
 (3.7100) (4.0100) (3.3000) 
Private investor  0.2395 0.2730 
  (0.7000) (0.6800) 
State   -2.0749*** 
   (-3.0500) 
Industrial corporation  0.7948** 0.7850** 
  (2.5800) (2.2300) 
Financial corporation   0.7747** 
   (2.0400) 
Miscellaneous  0.5364* 0.5816* 
  (1.8700) (1.7500) 
ROA 9.3740*** 9.4961*** 10.1760*** 
 (13.2000) (13.1400) (13.3400) 
Ln(age) 0.3111*** 0.2901*** 0.2649** 
 (3.0900) (2.8300) (2.4900) 
Ln(size) -0.1249*** -0.1255*** -0.1117*** 
 (-3.0800) (-2.9800) (-2.6000) 
Leverage -0.1388 -0.1834 -0.1563 
 (-0.7600) (-0.9300) (-0.7900) 
Sales growth -0.0101 -0.0113 -0.0114 
 (-0.3600) (-0.3900) (-0.3700) 
Family name -0.2672** -0.2852** -0.2946** 
 (-2.1500) (-2.2700) (-2.3200) 
Intercept 0.6829 0.4107 0.2121 
 (0.7000) (0.4000) (0.2000) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.1210 0.1259 0.1758 
Observations 1353 1353 1353 
Notes: This table reports the results of the regressions using the Minimum Dividend Require-
ment dummy as the depend variable for firm-year observations from the years 2008-2014. The 
sample consists of 1353 firm-year observations. The models estimated are, for all specifications: 
Minimum Dividend Requirement dummy = f(x), where x are the variables related to each speci-
fication. The numbers in parenthesis are the values of the test statistic. ***, ** and * show the 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. All numbers are rounded up to the forth 
decimal place. 
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Column A shows that the control a founding family exercises in the company has sig-
nificant influence in the decision of the company to pay higher or lower dividends than 
the amount required by law. The more power the family has (higher stake which means 
that the explanatory variable increases), the higher the probability that the dividends 
paid will be lower than the minimum required (dependent variable equals 1 when the 
company pays lower dividends than the Minimum Dividend Requirement). This finding 
does not support the hypothesis that founding families receive higher dividends from 
the companies they control in order to meet their income needs. 
In column B founding family participation is tested along with private investor, indus-
trial corporation participation and the miscellaneous category because based on the in-
formation of the previous section, these three categories are mostly encountered during 
the period as controlling shareholders. It seems that only the private investor variable is 
not statistically significant at any level. When founding family ownership, industrial cor-
poration ownership and other types of ownership included in the miscellaneous cate-
gory increase, they cause an increase in the probability of dividends to be lower than 
the Minimum Dividend Requirement as indicated by the positive coefficients. 
The last column includes all ownership categories. Apart from private investor, all the 
other categories are statistically significant and most of them positively related to the 
dependent variable. Only, the State is negatively related meaning that when the State’s 
stake increases, the probability of dividends to be lower than the Minimum Dividend 
Requirement decreases. This last model has higher R2 than the other two models, mean-
ing that it is more accurate.
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6. Conclusions 
This work examines the influence of controlling shareholders on the dividend policy 
of Greek listed firms, especially of founding families, and their incentives. Using data for 
a seven year period (2008-2014) and a sample that consists of 210 firms, it is shown that 
family firms pay, on average, 0.3% of assets as dividends, whereas non-family firms 
1.06% which is higher.  
Regarding founding family firms, it is tested, first, the hypothesis that family owner-
ship has an impact on dividend policy which derives from the entrenchment hypothesis. 
Evidence is found that, the negative relation between family ownership and dividends 
becomes positive after a certain entrenchment level which is estimated to be 57.2449%. 
The hypothesis that family firms pay more dividends than required by law in order to 
satisfy the income needs of the family is, also, tested. However, it is rejected because 
the analysis concluded that, when family ownership increases, there is higher probabil-
ity for lower dividends than the Minimum Dividend Requirement. 
The main results of these analysis have as basis for their interpretation the agency 
theory. As mentioned in previous sections, when a company controlled by a large share-
holder pays more dividends, it tries to eliminate conflicts between owners and manage-
ment (Ramli N. M., 2010; Adjaoud F. and Ben-Amar W., 2010). This is not the case for 
Greek listed firms as most of the founding family members that exercise control in a 
company are, also, active members of the management team or the Board of Directors. 
So, the main concern regards the conflicts between large and minority shareholders. 
This type of agency problem can be related to lower dividend payments as large share-
holders want for themselves exclusive benefits and are not willing to pay dividends 
which will benefit minority shareholders as well (Isakov D. and Weisskopf J. P., 2015). 
This analysis have some limitations which should be taken into consideration. First, 
the economic crisis and the intense recession affect significantly the financial position 
of all companies which due to accumulated loses and reduced turnover are not able to 
pay dividends to shareholders. The second limitation is that the analysis uses only data 
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for Greek listed firms and Greece is a small country that does not represent a large pro-
portion of the world market.  
In conclusion, further research is needed which will be based on the results and limi-
tations of this study in order to establish a better understanding and contribute more to 
the payout literature. 
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No information is included in the Appendix section. All tables are included in the main 
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